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The concepts of superindividual mind and superindividual person represent a double 
ontological challenge: in formal ontology, as higher order objects; in regional ontology, 
as minds and persons. I will discuss Stein’s (1922) phenomenological description of 
common intentionality and her accounts of individual and superindividual personality 
and personhood in Social Ontology. Her argumentation is first to be proved within other 
phenomenological accounts, particulary in comparison with Husserl’s concept of higher 
order person (Personalität höherer Ordnung), Scheler’s total person (Gesamtperson) and 
Gallagher and Zahavi’s philosophy of mind (2008). Finally I will try to compare it with Petitt’s 
concept of group mind, stressing Stein’s distinction between stream of consciosness and 
stream of experience and the way the latter is founded on the former.
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In English we sometimes say that a group that acts as a whole does something 
as one mind: is this a way of speaking that is only analogical or is it also ontological 
justified? Can we speak phenomenologically about group minds, i.e. about 
groups with their own minds? Do groups have their own phenomenological mind, 
i.e. can we find, as members of a group, invariant structures of experience that 
are not reducible to the collection of our individual experiences? Can we further 
speak about superindividual persons as ontological persons, too? 
Pettit argues that we can speak about group minds as “entities that are 
psychologically autonomous and that consitute institutional persons” in a way 
that “is consistent with a denial that our minds are subsumed in a higher form 
of Geist or in any variety of collective consciousness” (Pettit 2003). If we don’t 
accept any higher form of Geist, if we fear that any form of Phänomenologie des 
Geistes necessarily denies individual values, we risk to overlook an interesting 
issue of phenomenology of the ‘20s. Therefore I will try to compare Stein’s 
account with Pettit’s one.
Stein defines Geist as a structure of intentional acts: Geist relates in its broader 
sense to every intentional subject and to every intentional object. Acts are 
connected through nexes of motivation that can be implicit or explicit. These 
connections can be rational or irrational: one can be rationally or irrationally 
motivated to do, to think or to evaluate something. The concrete structures 
of these intentional connections are ex parte subjecti minds and ex parte objecti 
intentional objects. Stein describes the intentional structure of communal lived 
experience within Husserl’s transcendental concept of intentionality, which is 
marked by four moments:
Constituted intentional unity of experience:
1. lived content (Noema)
2. lived experience (Noesis)
Constituting consciousness:
3. stream of consciousness (temporalizing)
4. reflection
We do live in everyday common experience with other people, we do have 
experiences with other persons: we do something with friends, we make 
decisions together, we have parties, we play something together and so on. Do 
these experiences have a particular intentional structure that simply overlaps 
with individual ones or do they have new properties which don’t coincide 
either with simple individual experiences nor with their sum? Stein argues that 
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common intentionality is marked only by two moments:
Constituted intentional unity of experience:
1. lived content of group experience (Noema)
2. lived experience of the group (Noesis),
whereas constituting consciousness is essentially individual: we can say that a 
community has grades of consciousness, but doing so we are speaking about 
properties of her members, not of the community as such (Stein 1922, p. 
126). As we see, Stein agrees with Pettit who denies that group intentionality 
presupposes any variety of collective consciousness. 
Stein points out the peculiar way that common intentionality is expressed in the 
formula my intentionality as member of this group. To be a member of a group and 
to act as a member of it doesn’t need to feel like being a member of an us. I can 
act in an institution, I can follow its rules as a member of it without referring to 
any kind of us. To be bound to an us requires an emotional identification with 
the group that is not the key to understand every form of social group, only a 
very few of them. But what does it mean to live as a member of a group?
Stein defines the relation between communally lived experience and an 
individually lived one as a relation of constitution, not of summation. Individual 
contributions to community life are locked together in a unity of meaning and 
motivation that represents an experience structure of a higher order: no sum, 
but a new founded structure (Stein 1922, p. 130). We have to distinguish between 
the original constituting stream of consciousness and the constituted stream of 
experience. The former is essentially individual. Within individual mental life 
the stream of consciousness and the stream of experience are inseparable. Only 
through difficult trascendental reflection can one distinguish in one’s mental 
life constituiting and constituted streams of consciousness. This distinction 
is of primary importance when we reach the level of community experience: 
here we see how a new stream of experience arises out of individual streams of 
consciousness. This new stream is marked by the fact that it is constituted by a 
plurality of individual subjects: it is constituted by individual lived experiences 
both in its contents and in its way of being experienced. What “the individual 
as member of the community experiences, constitutes the material upon which 
community experiences are built up. They belong to a higher constitution level 
than the individual ones” (Stein 1922, pp. 126-127).
The same experience can be lived in its meaning both as an individual and as a 
communal one: I can experience a political event as member of a party or as me 
as such, a familiar one as member of my family or as me as such, and so on. On 
the other hand, every community experience in its being lived experience is at 
the same time an individual one: it is me as member of this or that community, 
my experience as member of a community. Of course as one can be member of 
a plurality of communities one can live the same experience in very different 
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perspectives: as an individual, as a friend, as a husband, as a member of a family, 
of a sport club and so on. Everyone can see what is meant, since everyday life is 
full of such partly discordant experiences: often our pratical decisions depend on 
the importance that we give to these different levels of experience. 
To live as member of a group means of course that every lived experience of 
the group is an individual perspective of the whole stream of experience: this 
perspectival quality can’t be given up. One cannot have a total community 
experience, one can have only a fulfilled individual perspective as member of a 
community. Scheler calls this essential character of social unities their nature of 
not concludable totality (Scheler 1966, p. 510).  
Summarizing, Stein describes the way in which individual community 
experiences do fill in a superindividual stream of experience as follows: “To 
this stream belong all experiences that are constituted through individual ones, 
whose correlate are superindividual objects, matter of facts or matter of values, 
empirical or ideal objects, further all community statement on its world of 
objects and all pure inner experiences (i.e. not related to an extern object), that 
are common to a plurality of subjects” (Stein 1922, p. 149).
To be a member of a community involves experiences and decisions that are 
lived within a community point of view: we can say that a community has a 
proper rational point of view. Has a community as such a mind too? If we intend 
mind as both costituting and constituted consciousness we are not allowed to 
speak about group minds. If we accept the idea of mind distinguished from its 
stream of consciousness we could maybe speak about mind as Pettit does. But 
in order to make such a distinction we have to accept the idea that the field of 
embodied mind doesn’t exhaust the whole personal life. Personal mind and life 
trascends the shape of bodily boundaries. The person has a new power upon 
her body, she can be the author of her life, she can mind it personally and can 
take responsibility. Gallagher and Zahavi distinguish between sense of ownership 
and sense of agency (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008, p. 161). I would like to distinguish a 
third sense of the self, the sense of authorship (De Monticelli 2008, p. 307): the 
experience or sense that I am the author of my actions and of my life.
Can we speak about a sense of authorship for communities? And what about 
responsibility? Stein is very clear: “The community as such is not a ‘free’ subject 
and it is therefore not ‘responsible’ in the way individuals are. Individuals have 
to take the last responsibility for the actions that they do in the name of the 
community” (Stein 1922, p. 174). The members of a community of free persons 
are co-responsible for each other, without exonerating each other from their 
individual responsibility: co-responsibility presupposes responsibility. Being 
a person means to be free: we can have a community of free persons, but not 
a free superperson. As constituting stream of consciousness, as individual 
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reflection, freedom is essentially individual (i.e. personal), too: we can say that 
spontaneity as such belong essentially to the individual person.
It seems as if we should abdicate the aim of this paper: there seems to be no 
reason to speak about persons of higher order, since there are no subjects of 
higher order that are free: as Stein and De Monticelli point out personhood 
requires capability for freedom. But in phenomenology we find descriptions of 
superindividual subjects, personal communities and conceptualisations about 
kinds of superindividual persons: we can find, for example, Scheler’s term 
Gesamtperson, Stein’s überindividuelle Persönlichkeit, and Husserl’s Personalität höher 
Ordnung. 
Scheler’s concept of Gesamtperson is presented as being opposed to the one of 
Einzelperson: both have individuality, both total and individual persons have 
personality. In Scheler’s ontology, individual and total persons are put as persons 
on the same ontological level: they are both constituted centers of acts who are 
constituted by a “psychophysically indifferent” person. Individual and total 
persons are both intentional individualities as such. On the other hand, not 
every social unity is a total person: Scheler distinguishes four types of social 
unity: mass, life-community, society and total person. A mass has not an 
intentional structure: formally it is a connex (its connection can have both a 
causal nature – such as the ormons who lead social insects lives – and a collective 
intentional nature – such as masses of minded beings who are joined in attention 
to something that is capable of influencing every individual behaviour in the 
same way). A society has an intentional structure which is constituted through 
conscious social acts that are able to institute social entities (such as promise, 
law etc). Every society subscribes to an abstract rational point of view, which 
its members should obey. Both mass and society are formally not independent 
social unity, because they are founded on independent beings. Life-community 
and total persons are on the contrary independent social unities because 
they both have an autonomous intentional center of essential different acts 
(Scheler 1966, p. 516). On the other hand, total personhood means to be a “unity 
of independent, rational individual persons ‘in’ an independent, rational total person” 
(Scheler 1966, p. 533): Total persons are the highest form of social unities.
These are the outlines of Scheler’s social ontology upon which Stein works 
out her community ontology. She profits from three distinctions that Husserl 
sketches in his formal ontology: the concept of objects of higher order, the 
conceptualisation of whole and part as pregnance and emergence, and the 
distinction between independent and non-independent objects (Husserl 1984). 
First of all, she makes a distinction between typical properties of the members 
of a community and their typical properties as members of that community as 
such: it is a very simple distinction that can be clarified with an example. We 
usually refer in our serious or trivial speeches to typical national characters, 
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such as the typical French one, the typical Italian and so on. These types of 
national member characters differ from what the same national members 
do as members of a nation as such: we could, for example, notice that typical 
members of a group do not usually act as members of it, but according to other 
reasons. It is only what the members of a community do as members of it that 
founds an intentional subject of higher order, i.e. an object of the same genus of 
the founding one that is founded in it and that cannot be imagined whitout this 
foundational relation. Such an object is an emergent object. Emergent objects 
do individuate their parts in a very peculiar way: these parts are called pregnant 
proper parts, because they are related and concretely connected to each other 
and individuated from the emergent whole. A member of a community has 
therefore some typical properties that members of that community usually have 
– proper part – and some founded and founding properties as members of that 
community as such – pregnant proper part (Conni 2005).
Within this formal ontological frame, Stein prepares a typology of communities 
that differs a little from Scheler’s one. She notices that in everyday German 
language one usually speaks about the Geist einer Gemeinschaft: what does this 
words refers to? She claims that ascribing a Geist to a community “means more 
than leading an intentional life, i.e. to be open to an object-world, to face it in 
meaniningful acts. Moreover it means that this life shows a qualitative unity, it is 
formed out from a center into a cohesive one. To ascribe a [Geist] to a community 
means something anologous to ascribe personal character to an individual” 
(Stein 1922, p. 248). To ascribe a Geist to an individual or to a community means 
to recognize in their life a qualitative unity that informs their acts: I tend to call 
this kind of qualitative unity personality. 
Stein claims further that there are independent and non-independent personalities. 
To be an indipendent object means formally that we can imagine it in its 
peculiar properties without helping us with other external objects that provide 
it with properties it wouldn’t have without them. Stein claims that there are 
personalities that are indipendent, i.e. that we couldn’t face without finding 
other persons who are authors of their life. She claims that to have a personality 
one doesn’t necessarily need to have sense of authorship: to be independent 
means to own a proper center of gravity, i.e. to live within one’s own point of 
view. Stein also calls this center of gravity the core of the person. She claims that 
“it is principially possible that an individual lives completely within the rational 
point of view of a community or that a community lives within the rational 
point of view of another one. Yet we do have a cohesive whole with a unified 
quality, though it doesn’t bear its own center of gravity, but is rather held up by 
something else” (Stein 1922, p. 248).
It is therefore possible to find personalities without core selves. How is it 
possible? Personhood means to be independent and capable of freedom and 
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since personality is founded on it every person has personality (De Monticelli 2008, 
p. 308). Stein claims that this founding relation is unilateral and not bilateral. That 
means that we can find personalities that are necessarily founded in personhoods 
but that can be founded outside themselves since they have to be founded in 
personhood. We are now able to follow better these distinctions: every intentional 
unity that hasn’t its own core needs to be founded on an independent one. We can 
have objective and subjective intentional unities. An example of an objective one  
is that of a landscape, which can be ascribed a kind of non-independent 
personality. On this objective non-independent personality (the landscape) can  
be founded subjective non-independent personalities, such as mythological spirits 
who relate to particular landscapes. Examples of non-independent personality 
can be found in every good novel character: these personalities are not authors of 
themselves but are conceived in the imaginations of their authors. 
We do have superindividual personalities that we ascribe to communities. Do 
they also have personhood? Stein claims that communities can lay claim to be 
recognized if they are founded in the core-self of individual persons. But although 
these superindividual personalities show a unified form they have no simple 
formation-root (Bildungswurzel) because their personal existence is grounded 
on the core of their members. We can only speak of personhood of higher order 
as a superindividual person who is founded by personal acts of its members as 
members of it. 
The concept of higher order person represents a double ontological challenge: in 
formal ontology, as higher order object; in regional ontology, as person. We can 
now try to answer to the original questions posed in this paper: we can speak 
ontologically about group minds if we face independent communities with own 
lived center of acts. We can call this lived center of acts mind if we accept that 
this mind has no stream of consciosness itself but only a stream of experience. 
It can exist as plural mind because as group mind it is founded on a plurality of 
embodied minds. Groups have their own phenomenological plural mind if they are 
independent entities.
We can speak ontologically about superindividual persons if we refer to 
personalities and if we accept the concept of personhood of higher order. This 
kind of personhood lives through the free persons who live as members of it. The 
persons who are essential for the superindividual personhood (and therefore for 
its personality) form its essential pregnant part that coincide with the totality of 
its members only in the supremum limit of the idea of community. These persons 
who are the essential pregnant part of the community are at the same time  
bearers of its personality and the persons who are more responsible for it.  
Through them as particular representative members of the community the 
community is itself responsible. 
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Finally we can say that group minds are “entities that are psychologically 
autonomous” only because of the fact that a superindividual psychological reality 
is only possible if its founding individuals are minded beings (Stein 1922, p. 267).
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